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INTRODUCTION
After Milton's Adam has partaken of the forbidden fruit and has
blamed his sin on Eve, he receives a deific lecture on coverture:
To whom the sovran Presence thus repli'd.
Was shee thy God, that her thou didst obey
Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide,
Superior, or but equal, that to her
Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D., 1985,
University of Miami; Ph.D., 1980, University of Michigan; M.A., 1976, University
of Michigan; B.A., 1975, Beloit College. I would like to dedicate this Article to
Beth Weitzner, a superb friend and top-notch lawyer. I am most grateful to my
research assistants Deby Raccina and Renee Duff.
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Thou didst resign thy Manhood, and the Place
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee,
And for thee, whose perfection far excell'd
Hers in all real dignity: Adorn'd
She was indeed, and lovely to attract
Thy Love, not thy Subjection, and her Gifts
Were such as under Government well seem'd,
Unseemly to bear rule, which was thy part
And person, hadst thou known thyself aright.'
According to Milton's God, Adam did not merely violate the laws
of Eden, but actually abandoned his governing status as the husband in
the marital merger. As Justice Black once encapsulated it, the coverture
doctrine is based "on the old common-law fiction that the husband and
wife are one ... [which] has worked out in reality to mean ... the one
is the husband."2 Coverture achieved this fiction by restricting married
women's legal rights, such as the ability to control property, and granting
those rights to their husbands.3 Many of married women's legal rights
were restored by the Married Women's Property Acts of the mid-nine-
teenth century.4
Another legal fiction that redefined identities in order to reallocate
rights is the myth of guilty property.5 This idea appears in Exodus when
Moses admonishes that "[w]hen an ox gores a man or a woman to death,
the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh may not be eaten. "' In some forfei-
ture cases, the United States Supreme Court has used the guilty property
fiction to justify governmental confiscation of property for crimes
committed by its owners.7 Essentially, property is treated as punishable
for the acts committed with it. Yet, in a recent decision, Austin v. United
States,' the United States Supreme Court devitalized the hoary notion
"that 'the thing is primarily considered the offender"' by acknowledging
that forfeiture is punishment imposed on human beings.9
1. JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LosT 239 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed., Odyssey Press 1962)
(1674).
2. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
3. See generally infia Part I.A.
4. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
5. See generally infra Part I.B.
6. Exodus 21:28.
7. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
8. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
9. Id. at 615 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921)). Even more recently in United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996),
D a ....
RESURRECTION OF COVERTURE
Although the legal fictions of coverture and guilty property have
been repudiated by statutes and the Court respectively, the Supreme
Court implicitly resurrected and fused the coverture and guilty property
myths in Bennis v. Michigan.'° In that decision, the Court approved the
forfeiture of Ms. Bennis' interest in a car in which her husband engaged
in sexual activity with a prostitute. This Article explores that resurrected
conglomerate in three parts.
Part I is a concise review of the feudal doctrine of coverture and the
disabilities it imposed on married women. In that context, I preliminarily
suggest that although the Married Women's Acts technically abolished
the doctrine, the image of thefeme covert1 nevertheless endures and, in
fact, surfaces menacingly in the Bennis decision. In Part I, I also explore
the separate myth of guilty property and how the Supreme Court has
sporadically used it to justify the forfeiture of property used in the
commission of crimes.
Part II focuses almost entirely on the decision in Austin, in which
the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause applies to in rem forfeiture proceedings.12 It is here that I advance
the view that at the very core of the Austin reasoning lies the explicit
recognition not just that forfeiture is punishment, but that it is punish-
ment imposed on a human being-not an object. As such, Austin
effectively disabled the guilty property myth.
Part III begins with a summary of the Bennis decision and ends with
an expose of Bennis as the resurrection and fusion of both the guilty
property and coverture fictions. In this context, I posit that the Supreme
Court, at least unconsciously, connects the old marital and forfeiture
fictions. Consequently, the composite image that ultimately emerges in
Bennis is that of the feme-covert as guilty property.
The conclusion, alluding again to the Miltonic diatribe on cover-
ture, explores the ramifications of the resurrected guilty feme-covert.
the Supreme Court appears to resurrect the guilty property fiction in deciding that
in rem forfeitures are not "punishment" for purposes of the double jeopardy dause.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2160 ("Although the Court prefers not to rely on this notorious
fiction too blatantly, its repeated citations .. .make dear that the Court believes
respondent's home was 'guilty' of the drug offenses with which he was charged.")
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
11. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENtAmES *442. See aLto infra note 16 and accom-
panying text.
12. SeeAustin, 509 U.S. at 604.
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I. THE MYTHS OF COVERTURE AND GUILTY PROPERTY
A. The Coverture Myth
At common law, an adult single woman could own, manage and
transfer property.' 3 She could sue and be sued. She could likewise earn
money and enjoy it as her own."4 Once that same woman married,
however, her status changed radically; coverture subsumed her legal
identity into her husband's. 15
Blackstone described coverture status as follows:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidat-
ed into that of husband: under whose wing, protection, and
cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our
law-French a feme covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be
covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her
husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her
marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an [sic]
union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the
legal rights, duties and disabilities, that either of them acquire
by the marriage.' 6
The coverture doctrine prevented a man from granting anything to his
wife or from entering into a contract with her. Such actions would be
futile because they would "suppose her separate existence ... and to
covenant with her, would be only to covenant with himself.' 17
The coverture merger was not mere metaphysics, but imposed real
disabilities on the married woman. For example, a wife relinquished the
13. See LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
Kanowitz states, however, that "[a]r common law, unmarried females were subject to
oppressive sexually discriminatory rules of law principally in the public sphere-as in
the denial of the right to vote or serve on juries on the same basis as men."
KANo Trz, supra, at 35. See aho John D. Johnston, Jr., Sex and Propery: The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1033, 1045 (1972) ("The common law did not treat
unmarried men and women equally; still, it imposed no special disabilities upon
single women.").
14. See KANowrrz, supra note 13, at 35; Johnston, supra note 13, at 1045.
15. See KANowrrz, supra note 13, at 35; Johnston, supra note 13, at 1045.
16. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442 (citations omitted).
17. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442.
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control of her real property to her "baron" and although he could not
alienate the rents and profits, he was not obligated to account for them
to her."8 Moreover, her husband enjoyed complete control of his wife's
interests, which meant that he could alienate them and unilaterally
pocket the proceeds.' 9 All chattels that a woman owned at the time of
marriage and those she acquired thereafter belonged to her husband. 0
The suspension of a wife's legal identity also meant that she could not
sue or be sued at law unless her husband had joined in the action or
"ha[d] abjured the realm, or is banished."2'
Coverture prohibited husband and wife from testifying for or against
each other in trials "principally because of the union of person."22 That
is, such testimony would be irrebuttably presumptively self-serving or
self-incriminating.23 In criminal law, a husband and wife could not
comprise a conspiracy because one person could not conspire with
himself.24 They also could not steal from one another because the
property belonged essentially to only one-him.25 In other situations the
wife was utterly divested of free will and viewed as "inferior to him, and
acting by his compulsion."26 For example, because certain criminal acts
18. See KA~owrrz, supra note 13, at 36.
19. See KAowrrz, supra note 13, at 36.
20. See KA owrrz, supra note 13, at 36.
21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *443. The quote reads in full:
There is, indeed, one case where the wife shall sue and be sued as a feme
sole, viz., where the husband has abjured the realm, or is banished: for then
he is dead in law; and, the husband being thus disabled to sue for or
defend the wife, it would be most unreasonable if she had no remedy, or
could make no defense at all.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *443 (citation omitted). Butsee KANOWiTZ, supra note
13, at 36-37 (explaining how "marriage did not represent a matter of all economic
gain and no loss for the husband").
22. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *443. Blackstone elaborates:
[T]herefore, if they were admitted to be witnesses for each other, they
would contradict one maxim of law, "nemo in propria causa testis esse debet
(no one may be a witness in his own cause)"; and if against each other,
they would contradict another maxim, "nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (no
one is bound to accuse himself)."
Blackstone, supra note 11, at *443--*444 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
23. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *443.
24. See KuaowiTz, supra note 13, at 36.
25. See KA.owrrz, supra note 13, at 36.
26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *444. The quote reads in full:
But, though our law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet
there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as inferior
19961
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on her part, short of treason or murder, were viewed as if done under his
"command," coverture bestowed upon the married woman a specie of
immunity.27
Many legal scholars trace coverture to the Biblical portrayal of
husband and wife as "one flesh. ' 28 The legal fiction that two separate
entities become a single unit is quite plainly analogous. Likewise, the
common law's hierarchical construction of marriage follows the biblical
model of female obedience."
Today coverture is usually treated as a legal relic. Beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century, each state adopted a version of the Married
Women's Act in an effort to eliminate the detriments of coverture.
These laws recognized the rights of a married woman to contract, to sue
and be sued on her own, to manage and control her own property, to
join the work force without her husband's approval and to keep the
money she earned.2
to him, and acting by his compulsion. And therefore all deeds executed,
and acts done, by her, during her coverture, are void; except it be a fine,
or the like matter of record, in which case she must be solely and secretly
examined, to learn if her act be voluntary.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *444 (citation omitted).
27. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *444.
28. Genesis 2:24; see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrTAWD, THE HISTORY OP ENGLISH LAW
405-06 (2d ed. 1923); KAowinz, supra note 13, at 38; Johnston, supra note 13, at
1046.
29. See Genesis 3:16; see also Ephesians 5:22 ("Wives, be subject to your husbands as to
the Lord."); MILTON, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
30. See KANowrrz, supra note 13, at 40.
31. In Michigan, the state that confiscated Ms. Bennis' Pontiac, the Married Women's
Property Act provides in pertinent part:
If a woman acquires real or personal property before marriage or becomes
entitled to or acquires, after marriage, real or personal property through
gift, grant, inheritance, devise, or other manner, that property is and shall
remain the property of the woman and be a part of the woman's estate.
She may contract with respect to the property, sell, transfer, mortgage,
convey, devise, or bequeath the property in the same manner and with the
same effect as if she were unmarried. The property shall not be liable for
the debts, obligations, or engagements of any other person, including the
woman's husband, except as provided in this act.
MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 557.21(1) (West 1988).
Other state statutes are similar. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-4-1, 30-4-8, 30-4-11
(1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.15.010, 25.15.020, 25.15.060, 25.15.100 (Michie
1995); Aiuz. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-213 to -215 (West 1991); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-502, 9-11-505, 9-11-507 (Michie 1987); CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 803, 913-914
(West 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-201, 14-2-202, 14-2-208 (West
[Vol. 4:129
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Even though coverture is technically defunct, it perplexingly en-
dures32 in certain contemporary judicial decisions that allow a woman's
legal identity to be entirely subsumed within her husband's.
B. The Guilty Property Myth
Legal historians have dated asset forfeiture back to the ancient
Greeks, who believed that objects were guilty of the acts committed with
them.33 Animals and inanimate objects were convicted of wrongdoing in
the Prytaneum in the second century B.C.34 As Oliver Wendell Holmes
has explained, if an inanimate object caused a human death, "it was to
be cast beyond the borders." 35 He attributed this punishment of objects
to "[t]he hatred for anything giving us pain, which wreaks itself on the
manifest cause, and which leads even civilized man to kick a door when
1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36 (West 1995); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 572-22,
572-23, 572-25, 572-28 (1993); 750 ILL COMp. STAT. ANN. 65/1, 65/5, 65/6, 65/9
(West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-201, 23-202, 23-203 (1995). But see FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 708.08 (Harrison 1989) ("[e]very married woman is empowered to
take charge of and manage and control her separate property, to contract and to be
contracted with, to sue and be sued. . ." but the statute does not also state that her
property cannot be liable for the debts of her husband); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-
209 (1995) (separate property is exempt from the debts and liabilities of the spouse
except for necessary articles or when the property is in "the sole and exclusive
possession of the spouse and the creditors have dealt with the spouse in good faith
on the credit of the individual property without knowledge that the property does
not belong to the spouse."); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-201 (Michie 1996) (separate
property is exempt from debts and liabilities of the spouse, but permitting necessary
expenses to be charged "upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of
them, for which they may be sued jointly or separately.").
32. Cf Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory ofAlimony, 82 GEo. L.J.
2227, 2229 (1994) (analyzing "the problem of women's and children's impov-
erishment upon divorce," states that "[tihe crucial issue concerns the distribution of
entitlements... [and an] analysis of those entitlements uncovers a system of property
rules, unchanged since coverture, that allocates ownership of family wealth to
husbands.").
33. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, JP., THE COMMON LAw 7-15 (Little Brown &
Co. 1949) (1881); 1 THE CMIL LAw 69 (Samuel P. Scott trans., 1932) (discussing
forfeiture in Roman law: "If a quadruped causes injury to anyone, let the owner
tender him the estimated amount of the damage; and if he is unwilling to accept it,
the owner shall ... surrender the animal that caused the injury."). Cynthia Sherrill
Wood, Asset Forfeiture and the Excessive Fines Clause: An Epilogue ofAustin v. United
States, 29 WAXE FoSsr L. Rav. 1357, 1359 (1994).
34. See HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 8.
35. HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 8.
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it pinches his finger. . . ."" This is "embodied in the noxae deditio and
other kindred doctrines of early Roman Law."37
The English common law embodied the guilty property fiction in
the form of deodand.38 Deodand derives from the Latin deo dandum,
which means "a thing to be given to God."3 9 Under deodand law, the
value of the object that caused the death of the king's subject was
forfeited to the crown, and the king in turn would dedicate the funds to
a mass for the dead person's soul or ensure that the deodand went to
charity. Eventually the religious or eleemosynary purposes disappeared
and the deodand became simply a source of crown revenue4 0
In England, deodand coexisted with two other forms of forfeiture:
"forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason, and statutory forfei-
ture." 1 The forfeiture of the property of felons and traitors ensued from
the notion of property ownership as being a "right derived from society"
and from the belief that one who breaks society's laws should lose the
ownership right." As such, the convicted felons' land escheated to their
lord, while their personalty went to the crown.43 Similarly, convicted
traitors lost all real and personal property, but it went solely to the
crown. 44
Statutory forfeiture was described by Blackstone as "penal." 45W ile
forfeitures that targeted "offending objects used in violation of the
36. HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 11-12.
37. Houams, supra note 33, at 11-12. The guilty object fiction also surfaces in Judeo-
Christian history. Moses admonishes in that "[w]hen an ox gores a man or a woman
to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh may not be eaten." Exodus 21:28.
38. See generally HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 24-25; Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wronful Death and the Western
Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170 (1973); Scott A. Hauert, An Exami-
nation of the Nature, Scope and Extent of Statutory Civil Forfeiture, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 159, 162 (1994); Michael J. Munn, The Afiermath ofAustin v. United States:
When is Civil Forfeiture An Excessive Fine?, 1994 UTAH L. Rav. 1255, 1260-61
(1994); Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture
Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIMmi L. REv. 911, 928 (1991).
39. BLAcc's LAw DicroN.aRY 436 (6th ed. 1990).
40. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993) (quoting Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974)).
41. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
42. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612.
43. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611-12. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682 ("The basis
for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the
King's peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.").
44. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611-12. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
45. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612.
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customs and revenue laws"46 rested on the guilty property fiction, they
nevertheless presumed a culpable owner who should be punished for
direct or vicarious wrongdoing.47
Neither deodand nor forfeiture of estate was adopted in the New
World.48 Before the adoption of the Constitution, the Colonies used in
rem forfeiture proceedings to seize objects under the English and local
forfeiture statutes." After the adoption of the Constitution, new enact-
ments authorized in rem jurisdiction over ships and cargos involved in
customs offenses. 5' Fairly recently, in Austin, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that our First Congress viewed such early forfeiture laws as pun-
ishment.51
In the mid-1980s Congress extended forfeiture beyond its typical
use in customs violations and admiralty law by employing it to combat
the spread of drug use and distribution.52 While there are presently at
46. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
47. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612. By way of example, a violation of the Navigation Acts of
1660, which mandated the shipping of most goods in English vessels, resulted in
forfeiture of the ship and the goods. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612. Even where the
violation was due to some mariner's act of which the ship owner was unaware, the
result was the same. The theory was that the owner should be blamed for entrusting
the property to the wrongdoer or that the unlawfiil act should simply be imputed to
the owner. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612.
48. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83.
49. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
50. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613. See also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (noting that
"almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved
in customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture under federal law"); Anthony J.
Franze, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture, and the Plight of "The Innocent
Owner", 70 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 369, 375 (1994).
These initial ... forfeiture statutes served vital national interests during the
early days of our Republic. In times of war, vessel forfeitures were used to
destroy the maritime strength of our enemies. Such provisions were also
utilized during the Revolutionary War to seize Tory property and later to
seize Confederate property during the Civil War.
Franze, supra, at 375.
51. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 612. However, until the Civil War, the guilty property fiction
was the basis behind statutory civil forfeiture. An Act that Congress passed in 1862,
which provided for confiscation of property of persons involved in the rebellion, was
directed not at the property-but the property owner. Munn, supra note 38, at
1261-62. According to Munn, after the Civil War, "statutory civil forfeiture again
became intertwined with the guilty property fiction." Munn, supra note 38, at 1262.
52. See 1 STEVEN L. KEssLER, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FORFErrURE § 1.01 (1994) (discuss-
ing Congress' efforts to combat crime by using forfeiture as an attractive alternative
to prison). The sponsor of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
1996]
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least one hundred different federal statutes," and even more state
statutes, authorizing civil forfeiture in a variety of contexts, 21 U.S.C.
section 881 has been denominated the forfeiture "centerpiece." 54 Under
section 881, the government can combine conveyance, asset and real
property forfeiture provisions and thus confiscate a vast panoply of
property.55
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Star. 1242 (1970), 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1994), Senator
Dodd of Connecticut, described it as "strictly and entirely a law enforcement measure
... designed to crack down hard on the narcotics pusher and the illegal diverters of
pep pills and goof balls." 116 CONG. REc. 977-78 (1970).
53. William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Forfeiture Statutes: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, 67 TMp. L. Rev. 1087, 1109 (1994). Carpenter has summarized the
federal provisions as follows:
Many of these are directed at per se contraband, like unregistered dyna-
mite, sawed-off shotguns, pornographic films, dying swine, the bacon, and
magazines devoted to bestiality. Others are directed at derivative contra-
band, such as bald eagle eggs, whales, video-games that violate copyrights,
smuggled potatoes, prison-made whips, Mayan temples, and untaxed
whiskey. Other forfeitable items include vehicles used to import aliens;
firearms used to kill animals in national parks; vessels and gear used to
poach halibut, seals, and salmon; equipment used to counterfeit currency
or coinage; vessels unloaded without a permit; vessels outfitted for smug-
gling; and containers, records, conveyances, manufacturing equipment, and
real property used in drug violations. The proceeds of racketeering activity
are forfeitable under RICO. A bank account consisting only partly of
proceeds of illegal activity has been judged to be forfeitable in its entirety.
Carpenter, supraat 1109-10 (citations omitted). See also Carpenter, supra at 1096-97
(discussing state forfeiture laws which "are fundamentally similar to section 881").
54. See David J. Taube, Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime: Civil Forfeiture, 30 AM.
CRiM. L REv. 1025, 1026-27 (1993).
55. See Franze, supra note 50, at 385 ("Forfeiture under section 881 dearly encompasses
a broad array of property ... ."). Another commentator has noted that this section
can lead to excessive forfeiture:
Because § 881 allows the forfeiture of any asset used in a drug transaction,
forfeitures have the potential of being excessive, in the sense that the
punishment is not proportional to the crime. For example, an expensive
yacht was seized by the government when one marijuana cigarette was
found on board.
W. David George, Finally, An Eye for an Eye: The Supreme Court Lets the Punishment
Fit the Crime in Austin v. United States, 46 BAYLOR L. Rev. 509, 509 (1994)
(citations omitted); see also James B. Speta, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug
Forfeiture: Section 89R, Substantial Connection and the Eighth Amendment, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 165, 166-67 (1990) ("By combining the conveyance, asset, and real property
forfeiture provisions, the government, under section 881, can threaten to seize all of
a person's property.") (citation omitted). This expansive breadth, along with the
absence of the procedural protections that are afforded criminal protections, has
[Vol. 4:129
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Significantly, the section 881 forfeiture scheme provides for an
innocent owner defense.56 This defense, at least in theory, gives such
owners a way to defeat forfeiture by establishing that the "act or omis-
sion" was "committed or omitted" without the owner's "knowledge or
consent."57 Not all forfeiture statutes, however, have such an express
innocent owner loophole.
Historically, the Supreme Court has used the guilty property
personification as a basis for condoning forfeiture in situations in which
property owners claimed that they themselves were innocent of any
wrongdoing." In one of the relics of forfeiture case law, The Palmyra,"
the King of Spain had commissioned the Palmyra as a privateer and then
used it to attack a United States vessel. A United States warship brought
the commissioned ship to South Carolina for trial.6" On an appeal from
the circuit court's acquittal of the vessel, the owner argued that the vessel
could not be confiscated unless he himself was actually convicted of
being a privateer. In rejecting the owner's position, the The Palmyra
Court said that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender,
or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing."
61
In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,62 an innocent owner had to
forfeit his property when a lessor defrauded revenue officers by conceal-
ing and altering sales records. 63 The Court maintained that, "the offence
... is attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and personal
prompted one section 881 critic to describe the forfeiture scheme as "[t]he H-Bomb
in the war on drugs," Rebecca Frank Dallet, Taking the Ammunition Awayfrom the
"War on Drugs'" A Double Jeopardy Bar to 21 U.S.C. _f 88s After Austin v. United
States, 44 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 235, 235-36 (1993), which is "making civil liberties
a casualty." Dallet, supra, at 237.
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)(c), (a)(6), (a)(7) (1996); see alo Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)(c), (a)(6), (a)(7).
58. See generally T. Michelle Ator, Constitutional Law--2r U.S.C. 9 88Y and the Eighth
Amendment: Application of the Proportionality Requirement to Civil Forfeitures: Austin
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 28o (1993), 17 U. ARK. LiTrLE ROCK L.J. 95, 95 (1994);
Hauert, supra note 38; Steven L. Kessler, For Want of a Nai" Forfeiture and the Bill
ofRights, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 205, 207 (1994); Piety, supra note 38, at 917-20,
967-73; Stacy J. Pollock, Proportionality In Civil Forfeiture: Toward a Remedial
Solution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 456, 462-63 (1994).
59. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
60. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 8.
61. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 14.
62. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878).
63. Id. at 403-04.
1996]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6 LAW
property used in connection with the same, without any regard whatso-
ever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner."
64
The Supreme Court has adhered to the guilty property concept in
the twentieth century. In J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,
65
the purchaser of an automobile had used the car to transport distilled
bootleg spirits. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the forfeiture of
the car even though it meant that the innocent seller lost the title he had
retained as security for the unpaid purchase amount.66 In so doing, the
Supreme Court said that "whether the reason for [the forfeiture] be
artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."6 7
Shortly thereafter, the Court in Van Oster v. Kansas68 relied on
Goldsmith-Grant to approve the forfeiture of a purchaser's interest in a
car that the seller had misused.69 Although Van Oster had purchased the
automobile from the dealer, she agreed that the dealer might keep it for
use in his business. When the dealer permitted an associate to use the
automobile and the associate used it to transport intoxicating liquor, the
state of Kansas sought forfeiture.7 ° In ultimately rejecting Van Oster's
claim that she should not suffer because the transportation of liquor in
her car occurred without her knowledge or consent, the Supreme Court
stated that "[i]t is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit
upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unautho-
rized action of one to whom he has entrusted it."71
By 1974, however, the Supreme Court began to question the harsh
consequences of the guilty property myth. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., a pleasure yacht which a leasing company had leased
to Puerto Rican residents was seized under the aegis of Puerto Rican
statutes after the authorities found marijuana on board in violation of the
64. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
65. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
66. See Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 508-09.
67. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511. But cf Austin, 509 U.S. at 617 (interpreting Gold-
smith-Grant as expressly reserving "the question whether the fiction could be em-
ployed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner"); see also infra notes 94-95
and accompanying text.
68. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
69. Id. at 468.
70. See Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 465.
71. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
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Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico.72 The lessor asserted that
forfeiture schemes that apply to the property interests of innocent
individuals are unconstitutional." Although the Court disagreed, it said:
It... has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to
forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or
consent .... Similarly, the same might be said of an owner
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware
of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to
conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not
unduly oppressive.
74
Thus, the Calero-Toledo Court acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that
in certain circumstances the artifice of the guilty property would yield to
the reality of an innocent owner. Read most optimistically, Calero-Toledo
indicated that the personification of inanimate objects, the very myth
that had traditionally precluded the innocent owner defense, was not
without its limits.
II. THE DISABLING OF THE GUILTY PROPERTY
MYTH IN AusTIN v. UNITED STATES
A. The Austin Decision
Austin v. United States 5 disabled the guilty property myth by
acknowledging that forfeiture is a punishment imposed on property
owners. In Austin, the United States commenced a forfeiture proceeding
to confiscate Austin's mobile home and auto body shop76 after Austin
pleaded guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute and was sentenced to seven years in prison.77 Austin opposed the
government's summary judgment motion by arguing that the forfeiture
72. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665-66.
73. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680.
74. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90.
75. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
76. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 602. The forfeiture provisions were 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4),
(a)(7). See also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
77. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
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of his home and business would violate the Eighth Amendment.7 The
district court, however, found in favor of the government, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 9 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of an apparent conflict between the Eighth and Second
Circuits over the application of the Eighth Amendment to in rem civil
forfeitures.80
The Court in Austin interpreted the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause as preventing "the government from abusing its power to
punish."'" While the Court had previously explained that "the Excessive
Fines Clause was intended to limit only those fines directly imposed by,
and payable to, the government," 2 the Austin Court believed that it had
not yet reached the pivotal question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause applies only to criminal cases.8 3
The Austin Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment was
neither expressly nor historically limited to criminal cases.84 Repeating
language from United States v. Haper, 5 the Court said that the "notion
of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division
between the civil and the criminal law."8 6 Thus, the salient consideration
became whether a given forfeiture is punishment rather than whether it
was labeled as civil or criminal.
The Austin Court examined the ratification of the Eighth Amend-
ment to ascertain whether "forfeiture was understood at least in part as
punishment."8 7 The Court concluded that all three forms of English
forfeiture-deodand, forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason
78. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
79. See United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 E2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
81. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607.
82. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 268 (1968).
83. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 606-07.
84. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 608. The Court noted that while the original version of
Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights that was introduced in the House of Com-
mons contained language restricting its application to criminal cases, that restriction
only applied to the excessive bail clause. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609. As such, the
"absence of any similar restriction in the other two clauses suggests that they were not
limited to criminal cases." Austin, 509 U.S. at 609. In fact, in the final draft, even
that single reference to criminal cases in the bail clause was omitted. Austin, 509 U.S.
at 609.
85. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
86. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48).
87. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.
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and statutory forfeiture s -were indeed punitive. Also, the Austin Court
opined that the First Congress that enacted forfeiture laws for ships and
cargo involved in customs offenses defined such forfeiture as punish-
ment. 9 In fact, in one such Act, Congress had actually included the
forfeiture of goods and the vessel in the punishment section.
90
In reviewing decisions in which it had characterized statutory in rem
forfeiture as punitive, the Austin Court dwelled on cases in which it had
rejected the innocent owner as a common law defense to forfeiture. 9'
The Court read such decisions, including Goldsmith-Grant and Calero-
Toledo, as premised on the understanding that owners were being
punished because they were negligent in allowing others to misuse their
property.92 Most significantly, the Court recognized that the notion of
forfeiture as punitive had endured in spite of the age-old forfeiture
fiction "that the thing is primarily considered the offender."
93
The Court referred to the "more recent cases [that] have expressly
reserved the question whether the fiction could be employed to forfeit
the property of a truly innocent owner."94 The Court found, given the
underlying "assumption that forfeiture serves in part to punish," that
such cases suggest that true innocence on the part of the owner could
raise serious constitutional concerns.
95
The Court then addressed the forfeiture provisions at issue and
found "nothing. . . to contradict the historical understanding of forfei-
ture as punishment."96 In addition, the Court noted that these forfeiture
provisions housed express innocent owner defenses, which made them
88. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
89. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
90. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613. The Austin Court is referring to the Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Star. 39, which, according to the Court, provided that "goods
could not be unloaded except during the day and with a permit." Austin, 509 U.S.
at 613.
91. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615. (referring to Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505 (1921); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878); United States
v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844); and The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1 (1827)).
92. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
93. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615-16 (citing Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511; The Palmyra,
506 U.S. at 14).
94. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617 (referring to Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 512; Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90).
95. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
96. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619.
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"look more like punishment" directed at those individuals actually
involved in drug offenses.9 7 Finally, the Court rejected the government's
invitation to categorize drug trafficking forfeiture as remedial.98 As the
Court noted, while forfeiture of contraband can have the remedial effect
of removing dangerous or illegal items from society, there was nothing
inherently criminal or illegal about the actual Austin property-the
mobile home and body shop.99
Also, the Court dismissed the government's contention that forfei-
ture is remedial in the sense that the assets serve as "a reasonable form
of liquidated damages."100 This argument fails because of the "dramatic
variations" in the value of the forfeitable property.' ° 1 Ultimately, what
the Austin Court pointed out was that even if forfeiture statutes have
some remedial goals, the fact that they also aim to punish makes them
punitive.'0 2
97. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(7) (1994)). See aho
supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
98. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22.
99. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621. The Austin Court focused on One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), in which the Court noted that "[there
is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile." Plymouth Sedan, 380
U.S. at 699. The Austin Court stated that "the Government's attempt to characterize
these properties as 'instruments' of the drug trade must meet the same fate as
Pennsylvania's effort to characterize the 1958 Plymouth Sedan as 'contraband.'"
Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
100. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United, 409 U.S.
232, 237 (1972)).
101. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
102. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 621-22. Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, said that he "would have reserved the question without engaging in
the misleading discussion of culpability." Austin, 509 U.S. at 626. He, however,
would conclude that "the in rem forfeiture in this case is a fine" because the statute,
"in contrast to the traditional in rem forfeiture, requires that the owner not be inno-
cent-that he have some degree of culpability for the 'guilty' property" and because
there is no "consideration of compensating for loss, since the value of the property
is irrelevant to whether it is forfeited." Austin, 509 U.S. at 626. Justice Kennedy,
with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined, also concurred and
explained that he was "not convinced that all in rem forfeitures were on account of
the owner's blameworthy conduct" and that "[slome impositions of in rem forfeiture
may have been designed either to remove property that was itself causing injury, or
to give the court jurisdiction over an asset that it could control in order to make
injured parties whole." Austin, 509 U.S. at 629 (citations omitted). He also indicated
that he would reserve the question of whether in rem forfeitures are always punitive.
Austin, 509 U.S. at 629. In a more recent decision, United States v. Ursery, the
Supreme Court held that civil in rem forfeitures were not "punishment" for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Ursery,
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B. The Disabling of the Guilty Property Myth
Forfeiture is not only punishment, as the Austin decision indicates,
but it is also punishment imposed on a human being. The Court's
recognition of forfeiture as a punitive measure against a person appears
in its historical rendition of forfeiture, its approach to the common law
innocent owner defense and its virtual extirpation of the guilty property
myth.
First, the Court identified a common denominator among the three
types of forfeiture existing in England at that time the Eighth Amend-
ment was ratified: each imposed punishment. °3 Congress' initial laws
subjecting ships and cargos involved in customs offenses to forfeiture
treated forfeiture as punishment." 4 For example, Congress included the
forfeiture of goods and the vessel in the punishment category in the Act
of July 31, 1789.105
Second, the Austin court's examination of the common law innocent
owner defense deflated the guilty property myth. It interpreted the guilty
property language as a formulaic encapsulation of the fact that "the
owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that
he is properly punished for that negligence. ' ' 6 In Austin, the Court
noted that it had never used the guilty property fiction to sanction
forfeiture where the owner was truly innocent or "had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his proper-
ty."
107
The Court's approval of the innocent owner defense suggested that
in some future decision, the Court would find that the Constitution
shields a truly innocent owner's property from governmental confisca-
tion. This foreshadowing comes across in the Austin Court's interpreta-
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the Austin
Court's disabling of the guilty property fiction and distinguished Austin as a case
dealing narrowly with the Excessive Fines Clause. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2143-44.
103. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 611 (1993). Deodand punished a property owner for careless-
n ess, as the forfeited object became a source of Crown revenue. Forfeiture of estate
punished felons and traitors. Objects used to violate customs or revenue laws were
also subject to forfeiture, and English forfeiture statutes (such as the Navigation Acts
of 1660) aimed to penalize those participating in this illegal activity. Austin, 509 U.S.
at 611-12.
104. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613.
105. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 613-14.
106. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
107. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.
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tion of its more recent decisions as ones expressly reserving the question
of the truly innocent owner."0 The Austin Court suggested that it had
reserved that question because of the underlying assumption that forfei-
ture functions as punishment not imposed on the inanimate object, but
rather on the object's flesh and blood owner1 9 In fact, the Court
acknowledged that forfeiture of one person's property for another
person's offense is justified by the notion that the owner and not the
property is blameworthy."0
The elastic reasoning in Austin cannot be legitimately confined to
an analysis of the Eighth Amendment or the section 881 forfeitures.'1 '
The core of the Austin decision is its repeated depiction of forfeiture as
punishment of a property owner. In fact, when the Austin Court actually
focused on the section 881 provisions, it used them primarily to corrobo-
rate the conclusions it had already reached through a predominantly
historical analysis. Even though section 881 differs from traditional
forfeiture statutes by containing an innocent owner defense, it is not that
attribute that makes the provisions punitive. Rather, in the Court's view,
the express defense is an explicit recognition of the requirement that in
forfeiture the property owner must have some culpability before she can
108. SeeAustin, 509 U.S. at 617 (referring to Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254
U.S. 505, 512 (1921).
109. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
110. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
111. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting, criticizing
the Court for its treatment ofAustin). See generally Stephen H. McClain, Running the
Gauntlet: An Assessment of the Double Jeopardy Implications of Criminally Prosecuting
Drug Offenders and Pursuing Civil Forfeiture of Related Assets Under 2. U.S. C.
§ 88(a)(4), (6) and(7), 70 NoTm DXME L. REv. 941, 976-77 (1995) ("[Because the
Austin Court] based its decision on the 'historical understanding of forfeiture as
punishment, the clear focus of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) on the culpability of the
owner, and the evidence that Congress understood those provisions as serving to
deter and to punish' . . . [and because] [t]hese three factors equally apply to section
881(a)(6). ... it should therefore follow that the section does indeed inflict pun-
ishment."). But see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2147 (1996) ("The
holding of Austin was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment, and we decline to import the analysis of Austin into our double jeopardy
jurisprudence"); Ator, supra note 58, at 129 (arguing that Austin may be limited to
situations where the property subject to forfeiture was used to facilitate a crime and
may not apply to proceeds forfeiture); Daniel P. Buckley, A Proposed Measure for
Excessiveness After Austin v. United States Put a Twist on the Forfeiture Laws, 29
GONz. L. REv. 621, 630 (1993/94) (arguing that forfeiture of proceeds is not
punishment). Accord United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1994).
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be so penalized."1 2 Finally, the Court stressed that Congress restricted the
application of forfeiture as a remedy for criminal offenses, thereby
solidifying forfeiture's innately punitive character.113
In reiterating its statements in Halper that "'[t]he notion of pun-
ishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between
the civil and the criminal law[,]"' 114 the Austin Court overthrew the
labels of "civil" and "remedial" that had limited Constitutional protection
in the forfeiture domain."' The Court also rejected the Government's
argument that civil forfeiture provisions are "remedial" and thus non-
punitive because they remove the "instruments" of crime from the
community and provide a form of societal and governmental compensa-
tion. 6
While there is some language in Austin indicating that forfeiture of
contraband itself might be "remedial because it removes dangerous or
112. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 619-20.
113. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
114. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48
(1989).
115. Before the United States Supreme Court decision in Haper, when proceedings were
denominated "civil," the Court rejected double jeopardy defenses to actions in which
the government sought civil sanctions for offenses that had been the subject of prior
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354 (1984) (holding that double jeopardy does not prevent the forfeiture of
property after the defendant was acquitted of the related charges); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) ("[tlhe acquittal on a criminal charge is not a
bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature, arising out of the
same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based .. ."). The Haper Court,
however, disposed of the autocratic reign of the proverbial labels, "criminal" and
"civil." Haper, 490 U.S. at 448. It instead defined a civil or criminal sanction as
punitive "when the sanction applied in the individual case serves the goals 'of
punishment," or "the twin aims of retribution and deterrence." Haper, 490 U.S. at
448.
116. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620-21. Before Haper, the "remedial label" was a significant
factor. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972)
("[forfeiture] prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United
States.... In other contexts we have recognized that such purposes characterize
remedial rather than punitive sanctions."). The Court has also likened forfeiture
penalties to a form of "liquidated damages" which are governmentally compulsory.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 237. The Halper Court, however, ac-
knowledged that where a civil penalty, imposed in a proceeding against a defendant
who has already sustained a criminal punishment, "bears no rational relation to the
goal of compensating the Government for its loss," then that civil penalty cannot be
deemed remedial. Haper, 490 U.S. at 449. See generally Hauert, supra note 38
(discussing remedial forfeiture); Piety, supra note 38, at 946-63 (noting that civil
forfeiture is justified as remedial).
19961
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
illegal items from society," 117 the Court did not suggest that other
forfeitures might be non-punitive. According to the Court, the section
881 forfeitures are punitive on their face in part because of the "dramatic
variations in the value of [the forfeitable] property," '118 which potentially
holds true for all forfeiture.
In saying that "forfeiture statutes historically have been understood
as serving not simply remedial goals but also those of punishment and
deterrence,"11 9 the Court deemed all forfeiture to be at the very least a
remedial and punitive amalgam. Under the Halper analysis, upon which
the Austin Court extensively relied, even the mere injection of a punitive
goal into a predominantly "remedial" or denominatedly "civil" mecha-
nism means that the whole mechanism is punitive in character.
20
In sum, Austin constitutes the Court's most outspoken enervation
of the guilty property myth. While the Court acknowledged that the
fiction itself endures, it expressly declined to employ it as a way to
circumvent the obvious reality-that objects themselves do not commit
crimes and that confiscation of such objects does not punish the objects.
The message of Austin is plainly that forfeiture is punishment imposed
on people.
III. BENN s AS THE RESURRECTION AND FUSION OF BOTH
THE GUILTY PROPERTY MYTH AND COVERTURE
A. The Bennis Decision
1. The Background
While driving home from work in the family car, John Bennis
picked up a woman standing by the side of the road. Shortly thereafter,
police observed him receiving fellatio in the car. Police believed that Mr.
Bennis paid the woman to perform this act.121 Bennis was convicted of
gross indecency and the prosecutor commenced an action, alleging that
117. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
118. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
119. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14.
120. See Ha/per, 490 U.S. at 448 ("[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the
term.") (emphasis added).
121. See Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W2d 438, 483 (Mich. 1994).
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Mr. Bennis' car was a public nuisance and thus subject to abatement.1 22
Tina Bennis, wife of John and co-owner of the vehicle, claimed that she
had no knowledge that her husband had ever used their vehicle to break
the law. 23 The trial judge nevertheless found that the vehicle was a
nuisance and abated the interest of both Mr. Bennis and his wife. 124
The trial judge apparently recognized the remedial discretion that
he had under Michigan's case law. 125 He also took into account the
couple's ownership of "another automobile," under the logic that they
would not be bereft of transportation.126 While the trial judge noted that
he had the authority to order the payment of one-half of the sale
proceeds after the deduction of costs to "the innocent co-title holder,"
he declined to do so.12' He based this decision on the fact that the car
was eleven years old and that the couple had purchased it for $600,
commenting, "[t]here's practically nothing left minus costs in a situation
such as this."
28
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Michigan
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the statute precluded the State
from abating Ms. Bennis' interest without proof that she knew to what
end the car would be put. 29 Further, the appellate court found that the
conduct in question did not qualify as a public nuisance because the
State showed only one occurrence of criminality and had failed to
present evidence of payment for the sexual act.
130
In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the Michigan
Supreme Court concluded that the occurrence in the Bennis automobile
was indeed an abatable nuisance.'31 It also determined that the State need
not prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be used
122. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
123. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
124. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
125. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
126. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
127. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
128. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
129. See Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). The appellate
court relied on People v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456 (Mich. 1927), which it
interpreted as holding that "proof of knowledge is required for abatement." Bennis,
504 N.W.2d at 733. Although there were other supreme court decisions to the
contrary, Schoonmaker "had never been expressly overruled." Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at
733.
130. See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 733-35.
131. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 483.
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in the illegal manner when she entrusted it to the user in order to abate
the owner's interest.13 2 The Michigan Supreme Court further rejected
Ms. Bennis' federal constitutional challenges to the State's abatement
scheme.
2. The United States Supreme Court Decision
In affirming the Bennis decision, the Supreme Court first addressed
Ms. Bennis' due process claim that she was entitled to challenge the
abatement by showing that she had no knowledge that her husband
would use the car to violate Michigan's indecency law. In rejecting this
position, Chief Justice Rehnquist adhered to several of the landmark
guilty-property-personification cases, which according to the court
"hold[] that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason
of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not
know that it was to be put to such use." 133
While the Austin Court had observed that Goldsmith-Grant had
"expressly reserved the question whether the [guilty property] fiction
could be employed to forfeit the property of a truly innocent owner," 134
the Bennis court retreated from this position, holding that its previous
"observation [was] quite mistaken." 135 The Bennis Court emphasized that
the reserved question in Goldsmith-Grant was "whether the section can
be extended to property stolen from the owner or otherwise taken from
him without his privity or consent."136 As the Bennis Court saw it, the
Supreme Court in Goldsmith-Grant and the Michigan Supreme Court in
Bennis had drawn the same distinction between the situation where a
vehicle is used without the owner's consent and one in which although
the owner consents to another's use of the vehicle, he or she does not
132. See Bennis, 527 N.W2d at 492. The supreme court relied on language in the statute,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3815(2) (West 1987), stating, "Proof of knowledge
of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants, or any of them is not
required." Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 492 n.26.
133. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. The Court referred specifically to The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1878), Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663 (1974). See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
134. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617.
135. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.




consent to the manner of the vehicle's use. 137 The Court thus reasoned
that because John Bennis and Tina Bennis co-owned the car at issue,
Ms. Bennis could not claim that she fell into the former non-consent
configuration.
Emphasizing that Calero-Toledo was the "most recent decision on
point," the Court reiterated that "'the innocence of the owner of prop-
erty subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a de-
fense."" 3 Bennis thus relegated Ms. Bennis to the same category as the
owners involved in early forfeiture cases including the. 1827 case, The
Palmyra.
39
The Court also specifically dismissed the dissent's distinction
between contraband and instrumentalities used to convey contraband.
The dissent argued that while contraband was forfeitable, "however
blameless or unknowing their owners may be," 4 ° an instrumentality
could be protected by the innocent owner defense unless the "principal
use being made of that property" was criminal. 141 In rejecting that
theory, the Court said that the due process analysis did not hinge on
whether the use for which the property is forfeited was the principal
use. 142
Ms. Bennis, relying on Foucha v. Louisiana43 and Austin, argued in
the alternative that the Court should import a culpability requirement
into forfeiture.'4 4 In Foucha, a criminal defendant was found not guilty
by reason of insanity.'45 The Supreme Court concluded that the State
could not confine that defendant indefinitely without a "punitive
interest," i.e. without showing that he was either dangerous or mentally
ill.4  Ms. Bennis argued by analogy that Michigan was required to prove
a "punitive interest" in depriving her of her interest in the forfeited
car.147 The Bennis Court, however, rejected the analogy and said that
Foucha did not overrule the guilty-property cases.
137. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
138. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683).
139. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
140. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005.
142. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999-1000.
143. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
144. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
145. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
146. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77-80.
147. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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The Court also declined to apply the reasoning in Austin, which it
said did not deal with the validity of the "innocent-owner defense." 148 In
fact, the Court suggested that the innocent owner defense was relevant
to the Austin analysis only because it was part of the statute and thus
amounted to additional evidence that the provisions at issue in Austin
had a punitive motive. The Court contrasted the Austin scheme with
Michigan's "'equitable action,' in which the trial judge has discretion to
consider 'alternatives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle.' 149
In addition, the Court opined that "forfeiture also serves a deterrent
purpose distinct from any punitive purpose."' 5 The Court found support
for this position in Michigan law, which deters dangerous driving by
making the owner of a motor vehicle liable for the negligent operation
of the vehicle by a driver who had the owner's consent to use the car.151
The Court reasoned that Michigan's negligence law would expose Ms.
Bennis to liability for her husband's use of the car.
Finally, Ms. Bennis argued that the forfeiture of her interest in the
car constituted a taking of private property for public use in violation of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.1 52 Without much discussion, the
Court disposed of that argument by stating that the Constitution did not
require the government to "compensate an owner for property which it
has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authori-
ty other than the power of eminent domain." 153
3. The Concurring Opinions
Justices Thomas and Ginsburg authored separate concurring opin-
ions. Perceiving factual similarities between Bennis v. Michigan'54 and
Van Oster v. Kansas,155 where a car used in a crime was forfeited even
though there was no proof that the criminal use occurred with the
"'knowledge or authority'" of the owner, 156 Justice Thomas argued that
148. SeeBennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
149. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (alteration in original).
150. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
151. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 257.401 (West
1990)).
152. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
153. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
154. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
155. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).




the lack of an innocent owner exception "builds a secondary defense
against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dispensing with the
necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and
the alleged innocent owner." 157
In addition, Justice Thomas felt that the Van Oster forfeiture was
actually "harder to justify" than the Bennis forfeiture:
[U]nder a different statutory regime, the State might have
authorized the destruction of the car instead, and the State
would have had a plausible argument that the order for de-
struction was 'remedial' and thus noncompensable. That it
chose to order the car sold, with virtually nothing left over for
the State after 'costs' may not change the 'remedial' character
of the State's action substantially.
158
In essence, Justice Thomas equates "remedial" noncompensable destruc-
tion of property with an unprofitable post-seizure sale. According to
Thomas, because the State action could be labeled "remedial," the case
did not really present the problem of punishing the innocent.'
59
Thomas acknowledged that if "[i]mproperly used, forfeiture could
become more like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from
innocent but hapless owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or
a tool wielded to punish those who associate with criminals, than a
component of a system of justice."160 For Thomas, Bennis was "ultimately
a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything
that is intensely undesirable." 161
Justice Ginsburg believed that the "sole question" was not whether
Ms. Bennis was entitled to the vehicle itself but whether she was entitled
to a portion of the proceeds. 162 Ginsburg added that it was "critical" to
the decision below that the proceeding was equitable in nature, signifying
that the Michigan Supreme Court "stands ready to police exorbitant
applications of the statute." '163
157. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Van Oster, 272 U.S.
at 467-68).
158. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also supra note 116.
160. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
161. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
162. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
163. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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The dissenters, according to Ginsburg, could not legitimately charge
the trial court with "blatant unfairness."164 The trial court elected not to
order a division of the sale proceeds for practical reasons-namely, the
fact that the couple had another car and that the 1 1-year-old Pontiac left
"'practically nothing"' to divide after the subtraction of costs. 165
4. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Breyer joined,
dissented, arguing that it was quite anomalous for a State "to experiment
with the punishment of innocent third parties by confiscating property
in which, or on which, a single transaction with a prostitute has been
consummated." 16 6 The Court's approach, Stevens believed, would permit
States to "confiscate vast amounts of property where professional crimi-
nals have engaged in illegal acts." 1
67
The dissent distinguished Bennis from the precedent on which the
Court relied by noting the "tenuous" nexus between the forfeited
property and the illegality.'68 The early admiralty cases presumed that the
owner of property was aware of the "principal use" of that property. 169
In fact, that same presumption applied to the confiscation of real estate.
Thus, the seizure of the premises on which the lessee operated the
unlawful distillery in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States7' was justified
when the owner "'knowingly suffer[ed] and permitt[ed] his land to be
used as [the] site."' 171
In contrast, the "principal use" of the Bennis' car "was not to
provide a site for [the] husband to carry out forbidden trysts."'172 The
dissent finds that there was no evidence in the record that the car had
been used previously for the purpose of prostitution.173 Consequently,
164. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
165. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
166. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877). See supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
171. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Dobbins's Distillery, 96
U.S. at 399).
172. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Bennis presented an "isolated misuse" of the vehicle, which should not
warrant the forfeiture of an innocent owner's interest in the property.'
74
The dissenters further distinguished Bennis from cases like J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,' where the forfeited property
actually facilitated the violations of the law. 176 Unlike the situation where
a confiscated car had concealed compartments for transporting liquor, or
where the seized yacht was used to carry a controlled substance, the
"forfeited [Pontiac] bore no necessary connection to the offense commit-
ted by [Bennis'] husband."77 That is, as the dissent saw it, the offense
could have occurred in many other places, and the car's mobility only
affected the preliminaries-not the offense's "consummation. "178
The dissenters also believed that-the Court's decision contradicts the
direction of recent decisions toward the curtailment of forfeiture. The
dissent noted the Austin Court's rejection of the argument that a mobile
home and auto body shop. where the illegal transaction occurred could
be forfeited as "'instruments' of the drug trade." 179 The Bennis' car was
not significantly different from other property which in the Court's eyes
had lacked a sufficient connection to the crime.
180
The State had characterized the forfeiture as being solely remedi-
al-not punitive-and described it as a pure abatement of a nuisance.
The dissenters, however, recalled the contradictory argument by the State
in the lower courts that the forfeiture constituted "swift and certain
'punishment' of the voluntary vice consumer."181 They also noted that
the confiscation of the Bennis' car did not prevent Mr. Bennis from
securing prostitutes. In fact, trial court testimony revealed that Mr.
Bennis had previously solicited prostitutes without the car.
Finally, the dissent noted the restraint of "fundamental fairness"'
18 2
on punishing the innocent which surfaces in Austin: "such misfortunes
174. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
176. Id. at 513.
177. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 620 (1993) (quoting Brief for United States at 32)).
180. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 22, Michigan ex
rel. Wayne Cty. Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994)).
182. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is
properly punished by the forfeiture."183 Because Ms. Bennis was not
negligent, the majority simply disregarded the reasoning in Austin.'18 4
The dissent also found conflict with precedent recognizing an
exception for "truly blameless individuals."' 85 The Calero-Toledo Court
had indicated that it would be unconstitutional to allow the forfeiture of
property when the owner "took all reasonable steps to prevent its illegal
use." 8 ' This principle could not be relegated to mere "obiter dictum,"'187
but followed a principle extant in an entire line of cases.188 Stevens speci-
fically referred to Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Peisch v. Ware'8
that "'a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which the means
that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be em-
ployed."' 9 0
The dissenters analyzed the forfeiture of an innocent owner's
property according to respondeat superior principles. The law has
established certain limits on a principal's liability in situations where the
"agent strays from his intended mission and embarks on a 'frolic of his
own."'1 91 If Mr. Bennis had been her agent, Ms. Bennis could not be
found liable for activity so clearly beyond her intentions. As a joint
owner, however, Mr. Bennis was independently entitled to use the car
and was thus not even acting as an agent."92
As to the majority reasoning that strict liability was necessary to ease
the burden of proving collusion, the dissent stressed that such a consider-
ation was irrelevant to the Bennis case.' 93 It was clear that Ms. Bennis did
not collude with Mr. Bennis to solicit a prostitute. 194 As the dissent
described, Ms. Bennis, "[i] fanything,... was a victim of [her husband's]
conduct."195
183. Bennis, 116 S. Cc. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
184. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-90 (1974)).
187. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting majority at 999).
188. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347 (1808).
190. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Peisch, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) at 363).
191. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See Bennis, 116 S. Cr. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority decision conflicted
with Austin, in which the Court had deemed the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause applicable to forfeiture. 196 Under the Austin
analysis, the confiscation of Ms. Bennis' interest in the property was
indeed an "'excessive punishment.'"' 97 The majority reasoning that the
value of the car is somehow irrelevant contravened Austin's holding that
"'dramatic variations"' in the value of forfeited property indicate forfei-
ture's punitive nature. 19
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that even
admiralty forfeiture did not provide an "unequivocal confirmation"' 99
that ships are always seizable when "used for criminal activity without the
knowledge or consent of the owner."00 Forfeiture of vessels existed to
compensate injuries when the "responsible owners were often half a
world away and beyond the practical reach of the law and its process-
es."2°1 The owner's lack of culpability did not become a defense because
of the interest in prompt compensation and the impracticality of adju-
dicating such innocence.0 2 As a "trade-off," the owner's absolute liability
was capped at the amount of the vessel and its cargo; an owner's personal
culpability was not actually part of the forfeiture rationale.0 3
Justice Kennedy further objected to the extension of admiralty
forfeiture to an automobile, "which is a practical necessity in modern life
for so many people."20 4 Like Justice Stevens, Kennedy believed that since
the Bennis' automobile was not used to transport contraband, its seizure
did not really fit within the contours of the cases that uphold the
government's use of such forfeiture.2 5
B. The Resurrection and Fusion of Both the Guilty
Property and Coverture Myths
The Bennis Court resurrected the coverture concept in three spe-
cious steps. Their reasoning culminates in an image of the feme-covert
combined with the concept of guilty property.
196. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 621).
199. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
200. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
202. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
205. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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First, the Court cast what is in fact a variegated body of cases as a
supposedly "long and unbroken line of cases hold[ing] that an owner's
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the
property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be
put to such use." 2
06
The inclusion of admiralty cases like The Palmyra"7 and Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 201 ignores Justice Kennedy's point
that practical necessity-not the myth of guilty property-explains the
early forfeiture of vessels.209 The Court needed to ensure compensation
for wrongdoing when the actual ship owners were inaccessible and
adjudicating such owners' innocence or good faith was nearly impossible.
In this context, forfeiture was in fact a trade-off that capped the owner's
liability at the amount of the vessel and its cargo, and in return treated
the owner's culpability as irrelevant rather than presumed. The guilty
property fiction served as shorthand for the trade-off in which the
shipowner became tantamount to an insurer.
The application of the admiralty forfeiture scheme to Ms. Bennis'
interest in her Pontiac is, as Justice Kennedy suggests, an implausible
stretch.210 Unlike the relatively deep pocket of the maritime vessel owner,
Ms. Bennis is a private individual with a car essential to everyday life.21
She is not "beyond the practical reach of the law and its processes, "212
and a judicial determination of her innocence or good faith is no more
difficult or impractical than resolving intent or scienter in any case. Also,
the Austin Court focused on One r958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,213
noting that "'[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an
automobile,' "214 disapproving of "the Government's attempt to character-
ize [the Austin] properties as 'instruments' of the drug trade," 215 and
206. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996).
207. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). See supra notes 59-61 and accompa-
nying text.
208. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See supra notes
72-74 and accompanying text.
209. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
210. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
211. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
213. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
214. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting One 1pg Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699).
215. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
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equating such an attempt with Pennsylvania's effort to characterize the
1958 Plymouth sedan as "contraband."216
The Court's comparison of Ms. Bennis' Pontiac to the vessel in
admiralty implicitly denies her very presence. She becomes, like the vessel
owner in early forfeiture cases, "half a world away and beyond the
practical reach of the law and its processes."217 The Bennis Court treated
her as a distant nullity, a thing without innocence or guilt.
The Bennis Court's approach to Ms. Bennis is reminiscent of
common-law marital coverture; her "very being or legal existence ... is
suspended."21 For the Bennis Court, what Mr. Bennis-the "bar-
on"-did with the property determined the fate of his wife's interest in
the property.219 In the vernacular of Blackstone, the Court "incorpo-
rate[d] and consolidate[d]" Ms. Bennis' "very being or legal existence...
into that of the husband."220
The Court's reliance on a purportedly "long and unbroken line of
cases" disregards inconsistent authority and the more recent cases inau-
gurating change. For example, the Court simply ignored Peisch v.
Ware,221 which predates The Palmyra.
222
In Peisch, when salvors carried off the cargo of a shipwreck in
Delaware Bay, the United States sought forfeiture of that cargo on
numerous grounds. The Government charged that the shipowners failed
to pay duties on cargo at the time of importation, and that they avoided
the tax assessment. 223 The Supreme Court, however, disallowed forfeiture
216. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
217. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
219. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
220. BLACKSrONE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
221. Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 363 (1808). See also, Miller v. United States,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 313-14 (1870) (upholding forfeiture as constitutionally
predicated on government's military power-not on the basis of guilty property);
Munn, supra note 38, at 1261-62 (describing the Supreme Court's detour from the
guilty property fiction). Munn states:
Then, in 1862 Congress passed a law providing for confiscation of the
property of persons engaged in rebellion. Although ostensibly an in rem
proceeding, forfeiture under this law was based not on whether the
property was used for insurrectionary purposes, but on whether the
property owner was a Confederate soldier or supporter.
Munn, supra note 38, at 1261-62 (citations omitted).
222. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). See supra notes 59-61 and accompa-
nying text.
223. See Peisch, 8 U.S. at 358-59.
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because the ship owners were unable to comply with the customs law.224
The crew had abandoned the ship before landing, and the vessel simply
could not reach the port. 25
The Peisch Court said that "a forfeiture can only be applied to those
cases in which the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a
forfeiture may be employed."226 The Court equated the situation in
Peisch with a "private theft, or open robbery" for which the owner surely
should not suffer.227 The broad meaning of the Peisch decision is that
property owners should not be punished for the conduct of third persons
over whom such owners have no control.
Ms. Bennis was not unlike the shipowners in Peisch who could not
be punished for actions taken by the third parties. The purpose of the
Bennis car was for Mr. Bennis' commute to work. The record contained
no evidence that Ms. Bennis gave him permission to use the car to pick
up prostitutes. Moreover, Ms. Bennis gave uncontroverted testimony that
she did not know that her husband would do anything other than come
directly home from work. In fact, it was shown that when he failed to
return on the night of his illicit tryst, she actually took action and called
"Missing Persons." 228
The Court's failure to address the exonerating premise in Peisch or
to even distinguish it demonstrates the underlying influence of coverture
on the Court's reasoning. While both cases implicate a third party or
involve the conduct of someone other than the owner whose property
interest is at stake, Mr. Bennis is not and cannot be a third party for the
Court. He is instead the "covert-baron" who has absorbed his wife's
identity.229
The Court also ignores language in J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co.
v. United State?3" and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.23 that
foreshadowed a future case in which a truly innocent owner has a viable
defense. In Goldsmith-Grant, the Court expressly reserved judgment "as
to whether [the forfeiture could] be extended to property stolen from the
224. See Peisch, 8 U.S. at 3 64-65.
225. See Peisch, 8 U.S. at 363.
226. Peisch, 8 U.S. at 363.
227. Peisch, 8 U.S. at 364.
228. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008.
229. BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
230. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921).
231. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
[VCol. 4:129
RESURRECTION OF COVERTURE
owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent. "' 3z
Similarly, in Calero-Toledo, the Court questioned the constitutionality of
forfeiture where the "owner ... proved not only that he was uninvolved
in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property .... 233 The Bennis Court diminished the Calero-Toledo
definition of an innocent owner into mere "obiter dictum." 34 The Court
acknowledged the change in the case law only by saying that the Austin
Court was "mistaken" when it had said that the reserved question in
Goldsmith-Grant dealt with that "truly innocent owner."235
Calero-Toledo and Goldsmith-Grant plainly diverge from earlier
forfeiture cases. These two cases create a definition of a truly innocent
owner that Ms. Bennis easily fulfills. Uncontradicted testimony estab-
lished that Ms. Bennis was not involved in and was not aware of her
husband's use of the car for purchasing sex. Moreover, she had no reason
to know of the illegal use of the car because Mr. Bennis had always come
directly home from work before. While it would be unreasonable for her
to relentlessly stalk him or have him accompanied by a chaperon on all
of his steel mill commutes, she did do what was reasonable. She, in fact,
took action and called "Missing Persons" on the one night that he did
not come promptly home.
2 36
The Court's make-believe backward time travel erased the Married
Women's Acts237 and replaced them with oppressive coverture disabilities.
That is, Ms. Bennis effectively became Mr. Bennis and their awareness
and acts became one. 238
The real essence of the coverture doctrine was reanimated by Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion.239 While the Court passively ignored her
separate property interest and sub silentio viewed the car as if it belonged
solely to the Bennis "lord", Justice Ginsburg actively bestowed upon Ms.
Bennis a virtual "propertyless" status. Justice Ginsburg accomplished this
232. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 512. See also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602,
617 (1993).
233. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. See also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
234. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
235. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
236. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
238. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442-*443 (citations omitted).
239. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442--443
(citations omitted).
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reanimation by defending the trial judge's decision to award Ms. Bennis
nothing.240 Although there was "practically nothing" left after subtraction
of costs to compensate Ms. Bennis for her interest,241 there was indeed
something to which she was entitled. Justice Ginsburg's approval of
denying a separate interest to Ms. Bennis translates, however, into a
perception of Ms. Bennis as really having no interest, despite the undis-
puted fact that she had acquired an ownership interest by expending
money she had earned herself. The effect is to treat both Ms. Bennis and
the whole car as his.
Second, coverture is resurrected through the Court's derogation of
its own significant Austin decision.242 As discussed above, in Austin the
Court recognized that all forfeiture is punishment.243 The Court arrived
at this conclusion primarily through a historical analysis of forfeiture and
through examination of its own "innocent owner" cases.244 In this
context, the Court debunked the guilty property fiction, acknowledging
not only that forfeiture imposes punishment, but that its punitive target
is the property owner. In so doing, the Austin Court clearly stated that
it had never used the guilty property personification as a justification of
forfeiture where the owner was truly innocent or "had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the unlawful use of his proper-
ty.,,245
The Bennis Court, however, eviscerated Austin. The Court denied
that the Austin case dealt with the "validity of the 'innocent-owner
defense.' ,246 In fact, the Austin Court's recognition of a potential forfei-
ture immunity for the "truly innocent" owner is a significant part of the
analysis: it is one of the main bases for the Court's ultimate conclusion
that forfeiture is punitive.
Further, the Bennis Court tried to escape the Austin bind by inter-
preting Austin as merely "point[ing] out that if a forfeiture statute allows
such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute itself
is 'punitive' in motive."247 Such an interpretation, however, amounts to
an outright concession that the Austin decision did not hinge upon the
240. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003.
241. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003.
242. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 602.
243. See supra Part II.B.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.
246. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
247. Bennis, 116 S. Cc. at 1000.
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existence of a statutory innocent owner defense. Rather, as the Bennis
Court apparently saw it, in Austin the Court had only used those
provisions to bolster what already was its assessment-namely, that
forfeiture by its very nature punishes a culpable owner.
The Bennis Court's transparent attempt to narrow Austin is unten-
able. The Bennis Court suggests that Austin stands only for the propo-
sition that "forfeiture proceedings are subject to the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines."248 It should be
undeniable, however, that the very foundation upon which the Eighth
Amendment analysis rests is the understanding of forfeiture as punish-
ment and that without that understanding, the whole Eighth Amend-
ment construct would simply topple.249
The once definitive labels, "civil" and "criminal," were rejected in
Austin: "'[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it,
cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law.' "250 The
Bennis Court strained to vindicate the Michigan forfeiture proceeding at
issue by affixing to it an "equitable" title and by deeming it significant
that Michigan law gives trial judges "discretion to consider 'alterna-
tives . . "'.251 Since the "civil" label does not make forfeiture non-
punitive, packaging forfeiture with an "equitable" label should not make
a difference. Also, because it is apodictic that judges have discretion in
the context of criminal sentencing, and that a criminal sentence is
nevertheless punishment, discretion cannot be the differentiating factor
making a forfeiture scheme instantly non-punitive.
All efforts to distinguish and narrow Austin fail embarrassingly in
Bennis. If Austin is not overruled, then its loud and clear message that
forfeiture punishes culpable people-not culpable objects-endures.
Beneath its veneer, the Bennis decision intimated not only that it is
irrelevant whether Ms. Bennis did "all that reasonably could be expected
to prevent the proscribed use of [the] property, ' 252 but also that Ms.
248. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
249. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 ("Thus, the question is not, as the United States would
have it, whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but
rather whether it is punishment."). See alo United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2158 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The punitive nature [of the
forfeiture provisions] was accepted by every Member of the Austin Court.").
250. Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48
(1989)).
251. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000. See also Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring).
252. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Cakro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689).
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Bennis herself does nothing and can do nothing. To the Court, there is
only one actor in the married couple-Mr. Bennis. This idea is remi-
niscent of the coverture precept that in certain instances, the wife acts
"by [her husband's] compulsion" and thus, is not really acting at all.253
Third, the Bennis Court resurrected coverture not only by refusing
to see Ms. Bennis as doing and acting, but also by denying that she is
a person being subjected to punishment. In so doing, the Court resur-
rected not just coverture, but the guilty property myth and blended it
with the statutorily disestablished doctrine of coverture.
The congealment of coverture and guilty property manifests itself
not only in the Court's insistence that Austin did not validate the
"innocent owner defense"2 54 but also in its illogical dismissal of the
Foucha v. Louisiana case.255 Ms. Bennis had offered Foucha for the
proposition that criminal defendants cannot be punished for crimes if
they are found to be not guilty. The Court's only response to Ms.
Bennis' Foucha argument was that "Foucha did not purport to discuss,
let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases. "256
Foucha can harmoniously coexist with The Palmyra only if blind
faith in guilty property is once again flourishing. That is, although
Foucha may say that innocent people cannot be punished, The Palmyra
validates the punishment because people are not being punished at all.257
While it could be mere coincidence that the Bennis decision resur-
rected the myths of guilty property and of the feme-covert in one fell
swoop, it is more likely that a subliminal ligature connects the two
myths. That is, somewhere in the Court's deliberative process there is a
link between the wife in coverture and guilty property. Specifically, the
feme-covet has no "being," no "legal existence. ' 258 All of that "life" is
suspended and she becomes a thing or a piece of property, which is
wholly "under the influence of her husband. '259
253. See BICcsroNa, supra note 11, at *444; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying
text.
254. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
255. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)). See
supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text.
256. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
257. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. ("The thing is here primarily considered as the offender,
or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing."). See also supra notes 59-61
and accompanying text.
258. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *44 1; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
259. BLAcKSTONE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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The Bennis Court equated Ms. Bennis not with property having a
neutral valence, but with "guilty" property, denying that she was an
"innocent." For the Court, Ms. Bennis is not what the dissent said she
was-not "as blameless as if a thief, rather than her husband, had used
the car in a criminal episode."26 The Court never even considered the
emotional toll on Ms. Bennis or the reality that Ms. Bennis herself feels
no or should feel no responsibility for her husband's lascivious escapade.
Rather, the Court's opinion sketched Ms. Bennis as if she is some-
how at fault regarding her husband's infidelity. She becomes, in essence,
not just the feme-covert, but his guilty feme-covert-somewhat like the
ship, a distillery or a vehicle that has brought about its own demise.261
She is what Holmes once described as the offending door that "even
civilized man .. .kick[s] .. .when it pinches his finger. "262
Ironically, the nexus between Ms. Bennis and guilty property
destroys one of the few coverture presumptions that slightly favored the
wife at common law. As discussed above, a common-law feme-covert
could not be guilty of certain unlawful acts because such acts were
simply deemed to be done under the aegis of her husband.263 Here,
however, the Bennis Court'sfeme-covert, likened to guilty property, is not
immune from criminal liability but actually vicariously liable for her
husband's acts. The Court makes this sentiment almost explicit when it
compares the "deterrent mechanism" of forfeiture to Michigan's vicarious
liability statute, which exposes a motor vehicle owner to liability for the
driver's negligence.264
When coverture and guilty property converge, the effect is doubly
unfair: the mythic amalgam becomes the worst of both worlds. Specifi-
cally, as resurrected by the Bennis Court, the present dayfeme-covert is
nothing and has nothing when she is blameless; but when he is culpable,
she comes to life for the sole purpose of being blamed. As rendered by
the Bennis Court, the wife, like the deodand's progenitor, becomes an
inanimate object "cast beyond the borders" for an actor's offense.265
260. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text (discussing dassic guilty property
cases).
262. See HoLMEs, supra note 33, at 11-12; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
264. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.401 (West
1990)).
265. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with the exploration of two seemingly separate
myths: coverture in common law marriage and that of guilty property in
forfeiture proceedings. As Blackstone describes it, marital coverture fused
the husband and wife and "incorporated and consolidated [her] into...
the husband."266 In coverture, the wife relinquished the control and
management of her property to her husband.267 With respect to chattels
that the woman owned at the time of marriage and those she acquired
later, coverture transformed the husband into the owner.26
Forfeiture proceedings are rooted in the myth that objects are guilty
of the wrongs committed with them.26' The United States Supreme
Court has used the guilty property personification to approve forfeiture
in situations in which property owners claimed innocence. In these
forfeiture decisions the Court has vilified culpable ships, an offending
distillery and guilty cars.27
Until Bennis v. Michigan, both the coverture and guilty property
myths had been vanquished. All states, including Michigan, have statu-
torily abolished coverture disabilities.27' Today's married women can
contract, sue and be sued on their own, manage and control their own
property, join the work force without their husbands' consent and keep
the money they earn.27
2
While the state legislatures have defeated coverture, the United
States Supreme Court has enervated the guilty property fiction. In
Austin, the Supreme Court clearly proclaimed not only that forfeiture
punishes but that it punishes human beings-not objects.273 In fact,
implicit in Austin is a prefiguration of a case in which the Court would
disallow the confiscation of property belonging to a truly innocent owner
even where the forfeiture provisions at issue lack an innocent owner
exemption.2 7
4
266. BLAccSroNE, supra note 11, at *442; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
268. See supra text accompanying note 20.
269. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.B.
274. SeeAustin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) ("If forfeiture had been under-
stood not to punish the owner, there would have been no reason to reserve the case
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The Bennis Court resurrected both the coverture and guilty property
myths. By implicitly comparing Ms. Bennis' car to the vessels in the old
admiralty forfeiture cases, the Court effectively "suspended" the wife's
very existence.27 5 Like the shipowner, who was "half a world away and
beyond the practical reach of the law and its processes,"276 Ms. Bennis
was peripheral to this analysis. For the Bennis Court, the wife is a nullity;
Mr. Bennis' use of the property determined the fate of his wife's interest
in the property.27 In short, the property is wholly his.
The Bennis Court also declined to confront the analogous situation
in Peisch v. Ware,27s which involved the conduct of individuals other
than the person whose property interest was at stake.2 79 The Court's
disregard of Peisch inherently suggests that the Bennis situation does not
involve the conduct of an individual who is actually separate from the
owner."' That is, the Bennis Court effectively merged husband and wife
into the ubiquitous him.
The Court also rejected crucial language in J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States8' and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.282 that carves out an exemption from loss of property for truly
innocent owners who are not involved in or aware of the wrongful
activity and have done all that they reasonably could do to prevent the
illegal use of the property. In essence, the Court reneged on its pledge
of a truly innocent owner. Indeed, it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves
in part to punish that the Court's past reservation of that question makes sense.").
See aho supra Part II.B.
275. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
276. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1010 (1996) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
277. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
278. Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, (1808).
279. See supra notes 221-227.
280. In Bennis, the Court also uses Mr. Bennis' co-ownership of the vehicle to imply Ms.
Bennis' consent to his use as a basis for depriving her of her use of the car, and thus
distinguishes her from a "truly innocent" owner. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5. In
truth, however, the Court treats them as one being-him, and this fusion divests her
of her ability to withhold consent.
281. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921) (reserving
question of "whether the section can be extended to property stolen from the owner
or otherwise taken from him without his privity or consent").
282. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) ("[I]t would
be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not only
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property."). See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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in Austin to insulate the truly innocent from forfeiture even where the
forfeiture provisions do not contain an express innocent owner defense.
Because Ms. Bennis epitomizes the innocent owner, the Bennis decision
surely should have been the one to take the step that the Austin court
had presaged.
By ignoringJ. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant, Calero-Toledo and Austin, the
Bennis Court effectively turned back the clocks, deleting the Married
Women's Acts8 3 and inserting coverture disabilities.1 4 Ms. Bennis was
reborn as the nouveaufeme covert.15 Although Ms. Bennis had paid for
her interest in the vehicle with money that she herself had earned, the
Bennis Court treated the car as if it were solely her husband's property.28 6
In fact, Justice Ginsburg's defense of the trial judge's decision to award
Ms. Bennis nothing reveals the perception shared by the Court and the
concurrence that Ms. Bennis herself really owns nothing.2 7
Through its disingenuous narrowing ofAustin and dogged adherence
to the hoary guilty property cases, the Bennis Court resurrected both
forfeiture and the guilty property fiction. Stated otherwise, the Bennis
Court once again empowered the guilty property myth and used it to do
what the Austin Court said it could not do: it made guilty property
justify forfeiture where the owner was truly innocent.
The Bennis Court, however, did not merely conterminously resurrect
two separate anachronisms. It actually fused the two myths by first
implicitly equating Ms. Bennis with property and then by imbuing her
with her husband's guilt. Ultimately, his mens rea or guilt became hers
so that the wife-like the ship, distillery, or car-could be punished as
the object that brought about its own demise.28
The Bennis Court's melding together of the mythicfeme covert and
the notion of guilty property is a most disturbing conglomerate. While
the coverture fiction "suspended" the wife's existence, the Court's
fledgling myth of the guilty feme covert denies the wife's existence
283. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
286. In fact, in the Court's view, Ms. Bennis cannot even claim that she withheld her
consent to her husband's use of the vehicle as a basis of why she should have her car
back. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
287. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Ms. Bennis' ownership of
the vehicle amounted to "practically nothing").




altogether by demoting her to a purely inanimate status. While common
law coverture sometimes bestowed upon the wife a benefit in the form
of immunity from punishment for certain crimes,289 the myth of the
guiltyfeme covert exposes the wife to vicarious liability and punishment
for crimes that are solely her husband's. By combining two independent-
ly noxious myths, the Bennis Court created a more pernicious compos-
ite-a guilty property wife saddled with more disabilities than the
original Blackstonian feme covert.
In Milton's Biblical epic, postlapsarian Adam, submitting himself to
a deific lecture on coverture, learned that his fatal flaw was uxoriousness
and met his supposedly "rightful" identity as the ruler in the marital
union.29 In the Bennis epic, Ms. Bennis also confronted her putative
crime-possibly that of failing to keep her husband faithful-and
likewise met her new rightful identity as not merely her husband's
subject but as his guilty property. She, like the second century B.C.
inanimate objects that Oliver Wendell Holmes described, was convicted
and punished in the Twentieth Century "Prytaneum." t
289. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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